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THE OHIO PERPETUITIES REFORM STATUTE
ROBERT J. LYNN*
The author explains Ohio's revised statutoiy approach to the
Rule Against Perpetuities.
Ohio has modified its statutory statement of the common law
Rule Against Perpetuities' in several important respects: (1) The
"possibilities" test for determining the validity of contingent fu-
ture interests has been abandoned, and an actualities or "wait and
see" principle has been adopted, together with a cy pres reforma-
tion component.2 (2) It is at least arguable that an interest aris-
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'The Ohio perpetuities statute as amended is as follows:
2131.08 Statute against perpetuities. [Page Current Service 1967.]
(A) No interest in real or personal property shall be good unless it must vest,
if at all, not later than twenty-one years after a life or lives in being at the
creation of the interest. All estates given in tail, by deed or will, in lands or tene-
ments lying within this state, shall be and remain an absolute estate in fee
simple to the issue of the first donee in tail. It is the intention by the adoption
of this section to make effective in Ohio what is generally known as the common
law rule against perperuities except as set forth in paragraphs (B) and (C)
of this section.
(B) For the purposes of this section, the time of the creation of an interest
in real or personal property subject to a power reserved by the grantor to revoke
or terminate such interest shall be the time at which such reserved power ex-
pires, either by reason of the death of the grantor or by release of the power
or otherwise.
(C) Any interest in real or personal property which would violate the rule
against perpeuities, under paragraph (A) hereof, shall be reformed, within the
limits of the rule, to approximate most closely the intention of the creator of
the interest. In determining whether an interest would violate the rule and in
reforming an interest the period of perpetuities shall be measured by actual
rather than possible events.
(D) Paragraphs (B) and (C) of this section shall he effective with respect to
interests in real or personal property created by wills of decedents dying after
December 31, 1967, and with respect to interests in real or personal property
created by inter vivos instruments executed after December 31, 1967, and with
res ect to interests in real or personal property created by inter vivos instru-
ments executed on or before December 31, 1967 which by reason of paragraph
(B) of this section will be treated as interests created after December 31, 1967.
An interest in real or personal property which comes into effect through the
exercise of a power of appointment shall be regarded as having been created
by the instrument exercising the power rather than the instrument which created
the power.
Osno REv. CODE § 2131.08 (C) (Page Current Service 1967).
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ing under the exercise of a power of appointment is henceforth
to be treated for perpetuities purposes as created by the instru-
ment which exercises the power rather than the instrument which
creates the power.3 (3) With regard to an interest terminable by
its creator, the perpetuities period begins to run when the power
to revoke or terminate ceases. 4
In moving from the traditional Rule to a "wait and see"
coupled with cy pres version of the Rule, Ohio joins Kentucky5
and Vermont,6 with similar statutes, and New Hampshire, with a
comparable judge-made doctrine3 Limited "wait and see" coupled
with cy pres statutes exist in a number of states." Combining "wait
and see" with cy pres is a more conservative approach to reforming
the Rule than is the adoption of a full-scale cy pres statute. When
"wait and see" and cy pres principles are joined, a limitation that
would have been void at its creation under the traditional Rule
will be good if it actually vests within the perpetuities period
under "wait and see" without resort to reformation.
THE TRDITIoNAL RuLE
The Rule Against Perpetuities is a rule against the remote-
ness of vesting of contingent future interests. 10 Prior to the statu-
tory change, Ohio's test for the validity of such an interest was a
possibilities test, not an actualities test. If the contingency on
which the interest was limited might be resolved at a remote time,
the interest was bad ab initio under a possibilities test even though
it was probable at the creation of the interest that the contingency
would be resolved within the perpetuities period, or even if the
contingency had been resolved well within the perpetuities period
and before litigation began. For example, if A devised "to B for
life, remainder to that child of B who first attains twenty-five,"
OHIo REv. CODE § 2131.08 (D) (Page Current Service 1967).
OHIO REv. CODE § 2131.08 (B) (Page Current Service 1967).
KY. REv. STAT. § 381.216 (1963).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 501 (1967).
Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Curtis, 98 N.H. 225, 97 A.2d 207 (1953); Edgerly v.
Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 31 A. 900 (1891).
a See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 45-95, 45-96 (1960); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 33, §§ 101, 102 (1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 197A (1966); MASS,
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 184A, §§ 1, 2 (1955).
9 R. LYNN, THE MODERN RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 39-40 (1966) [herein.
after cited as LYNN]. I have drawn freely on this book and other previously published
material when preparing this article on the Ohio statute.
2' J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 3-4 (4th ed. 1942).
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and no child of B had attained twenty-five at A's death, and the word
child was given its customary meaning of a child whenever born,
the contingent remainder was bad ab initio. It was bad although
a child of B was alive at A's death and became twenty-five two
weeks after A died and before the perpetuities question was raised.
"WAIT AND SEE"
Ohio's new test for the validity of a contingent future interest
is an actualities test. If at the creation of such an interest, the con-
tingency on which it is limited might be resolved at a remote time,
the interest is not necessarily bad ab initio. If A devises "to B for
life, remainder to that child of B who first attains twenty-five," and
no child of B has attained twenty-five at A's death, and the word
child is given its customary meaning of a child whenever born,
determination of the validity of the contingent remainder may be
deferred to a time beyond A's death. If a child of B attains twenty-
five within the perpetuities period, the contingent remainder vests
and is good under the "wait and see" approach.
CY PRES
For example, A devises "to B for life, remainder to that child
of B who first attains twenty-five," and the only child of B, con-
ceived and born after A's death, has attained but three years of
age at B's death. Under the "wait and see" approach alone the con-
tingent remainder is bad because B's life is the only relevant life
in being at A's death for the purpose of testing validity, and B's
after-born child cannot attain twenty-five within twenty-one years
after B's death. Because Ohio has combined "wait and see" and
cy pres principles, "1 the contingent remainder can be reformed at
B's death to save it from invalidity under the Rule. For example,
it might be reformed to read "remainder to that child of B who
first attains twenty-one." But this modification of the Rule Against
Perpetuities does not guarantee the vesting of an interest. If B's
only child fails to reach the age designated in the reformed instru-
ment, the contingent remainder fails by its own revised terms,
just as it would have failed under the same circumstances had the
testator himself conditioned his gift on the attainment of age
twenty-one by the devisee. 12
u Oro REV. CODE § 2131.08 (C) (Page Current Service 1967).
2 LYNN 36.
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PRIORITY OF "WAIT AND SEE" OVER CY PRES
Under Ohio's new approach, reformation of a contingent fu-
ture interest should ordinarily be deferred until it is clear that
the interest cannot vest within the perpetuities period as measured
by actual events. 13 Deferring reformation as long as possible is
consistent with the underlying justification for "wait and see,"
which is to carry out the intention of the grantor, settlor, or testa-
tor unless he in fact violates the Rule Against Perpetuities. The
cy pres principle complements "wait and see;" it does not displace
it. Although the new wording of the Ohio statute does not reflect
this relationship, similar reform legislation elsewhere makes ex-
plicit the priority of "wait and see" over cy pres. '4
THE PERPETUITIES PERIOD
Under the reformed version of the Rule, the perpetuities pe-
riod remains "lives in being" and twenty-one years. To the extent
that a life or lives are used to demonstrate the validity of interests,
the life or lives must be in being when the instrument of transfer
takes effect for perpetuities purposes (delivery of a deed, death of
a testator, termination of a power to revoke an inter vivos trust).
If a life or lives are not used to demonstrate validity, the period
in gross of twenty-one years may be used, just as it is under the
Rule in traditional form. Nonetheless, to the extent the amended
statute allows wider latitude with respect to choosing a life in be-
ing for the purpose of demonstrating validity,'5 the perpetuities
period is lengthened when the life so chosen is longer than the
life or lives permissible for demonstration purposes under the tra-
ditional Rule.
THE CONCLUSIVE PRESUMIPTION OF FERTILITY
Illustrative of the consequences of amending section 2131.08
is the following case. Suppose that A devises "to B for life, then to
B's children for their lives, remainder to the grandchildren of B."
B is a woman thirty years of age at the execution of A's will and
has a child or children at that time. Additional children are born
to B before A's death; B and one or more of her children and
grandchildren are alive at A's death; and B is sixty-five years of age
at A's death. Under the traditional Rule Against Perpetuities the
x' Id. at 39-40.
See, e.g., Law Reform Act, 11 ELIz. 2, No. 83, § 11 (W. Austh). (1962).
See Lynn, Reforming the Rule Against Perpetnities: Choosing the Measuring
[Vol. 29
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gift to B's grandchildren was clearly bad because theoretically B
might conceive and bear a child after A's death. Under the "wait
and see" aspect of the reformed Rule, could a court at A's death in
an appropriate case declare the gift to B's grandchildren valid ab
initio? Valid because the inability of B to conceive after A's death
is a fact that permits using the lives of the children of B to demon-
strate that the ultimate number of the grandchildren who share
in the gift will be determined within the perpetuities period?
The answer clearly is "yes." "Wait and see" sets the time limit
within which a contingent future interest must vest, if at all, in
accordance with the conditions imposed by its creator. "W"ait and
see" does not tell us when a declaration of invalidity can be made,
and it no more restricts us solely to declarations of the invalidity
of contingent future interests than did section 2131.08 in un-
amended form. In the case just put, the gift to grandchildren is
good under the "wait and see" principle because the conclusive
presumption of fertility can be rejected. No reformation of the
gift under cy pres is required.10
CLASS Gir-rs
Under the traditional Rule, a gift to a class is totally invalid
unless the ultimate number of persons sharing in the gift or the
ultimate size of the shares is determinable within the perpetuities
period.17 If A devises "to B for life, remainder to such of the chil-
dren of B as attain twenty-five," and the word children is given
its customary construction of children whenever born, the gift to
children is bad because a child might be born to B after A's death
and less than four years before B's death, and such after-born child
might attain twenty-five beyond the perpetuities period. Although
children of B alive at A's death will attain twenty-five, or fail to,
within their own lives so that a gift limited to them would be
good, the fact that an afterborn child of B might qualify for a
share after the perpetuities period has run invalidates the gift in
its entirety. Invalidity turns on the possibility, no matter how fan-
tastic, that B might have a child who might attain twenty-five at a
remote time.
The harsh effects of the all-or-nothing character of a possibili-
Lives, 1965 DUKE L.J. 720, 727-29.
" See Lynn, Raising the Perpetuities Question: Conception, Adoption, "1170it and
See," and Cy Pres, 17 VAND L. REV. 1391, 1398-1402 (1964).
' This is the so-called "All-or-Nothing' rule of Leake v. Robinson, 2 Mer. 363,
35 Eng. Rep. 979 (Ch. 1817).
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ties approach are reduced by the new "wait and see" provision. For
example, if B is capable of conceiving a child after A's death, the
validity of the remainder cannot be demonstrated at A's death
and so determination of validity is deferred. When events show
that the ultimate number of B's children sharing in the gift will
be known within the perpetuities period, the gift is good under
"wait and see," and no reformation under cy pres is required. But
if the only children born to B were unborn at A's death and all
are under four years of age at B's death, the gift to the children
of B is bad under "wait and see" because the children of B cannot
attain twenty-five within twenty-one years after the death of B,
the only relevant measuring life. I s Under Ohio's new cy pres fea-
ture, the gift can be reformed at B's death to read "remainder to
such of the children of B as attain twenty-one."
POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
Under the Rule Against Perpetuities in traditional form, the
validity of an appointment made by the exercise of a general power
to appoint by deed or will is determined by computing the per-
petuities period from the time the power is exercised. The validity
of an appointment made by the exercise of a general testamen-
tary or a special power is determined by reading back or inter-
polating the appointment into the instrument creating the power
and computing the perpetuities period from the time the power
was created.' 0 Unless the last sentence of subsection D in the re-
form statute is confined by judicial interpretation to its context,
an appointment made by the exercise of a general testamentary or
a special power is henceforth to be treated for perpetuities pur-
poses like an appointment made by the exercise of a general power
to appoint by deed or will,20 and the perpetuities period is to be
computed from the time the power is exercised, irrespective of
whether the power is a general power to appoint by deed or will,
a general testamentary power, or a special power. A comparable
provision of the Delaware Code,21 enacted in 1938, evoked a re-
sponse in the Internal Revenue Code. 22 Such a possible change
in the law of Ohio was not a part of the new statute as formulated
,' See LYNN 115.
See L. SIMES & A. SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 1274 (2d ed. 1956). Ohio case
law is in accord. See Cleveland Trust Co. v. McQuade, 106 Ohio App. 237, 142 N.A.2d
249 (1957).
2 OHIO REV. CODE § 2131.08 (D) (Page Current Service 1967).
21 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 501 (1953).
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by the Committee on Probate and Trust Law of the Ohio State
Bar Association, and has nothing to recommend it.
REvoCABLE TRUSTS
The general rule is that if a contingent future interest is cre-
ated by a revocable deed of trust, the deed of trust is treated like
a will for perpetuities purposes and the perpetuities period begins
to run on the death of the grantor, rather than at the delivery of
the deed.2 3 The amended statute explicitly states that this general
rule is the rule in Ohio.24
EFFEcrIVE DATE
Changes in the law frequently raise troublesome constitutional
questions. In this respect property law enjoys no exemption. Care-
fully prepared statutes changing property law are occasionally in-
validated because they are found to constitute an unconstitutional
taking of property rights without due process of law. The per-
petuities reform statute explicitly provides that the operation of
the statute is prospective, only, in order to avoid this type of con-
stitutional objection to the new statute.
CONCLUSION
Lawyers differ in opinion on methods of reforming the com-
mon law Rule Against Perpetuities. No purpose would be served
by relating the alternatives that have been proposed from time to
time or the comparable legislation enacted elsewhere.2 5 Suffice it
to say that the new Ohio Legislation has respectable antecedents.2 6
" INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2041(a) (3). This section includes in the gross
estate of the donee the value of property subject to a special power if the power is exer-
cised by creating another power of appointment which under the applicable local law
can be validly exercised so as to postpone the vesting of an interest in such property for
a period ascertainable without regard to the date of the creation of the first power. Sup-
pose that A bequeaths $100,000 in trust "to pay the net income to B for life, and then
to pay the principal to such of the children of B as B shall by deed or will appoint, and
in default of appointment to pay the principal to the issue of B who survive B, per
stirpes:' B is a bachelor at A's death. B by will appoints principal to his only child C
for life, remainder to such of Cs children as C shall by deed or will appoint, and in
default of appointment, remainder to the issue of C who survive C, per stirpes. Under
the Rule in traditional form, both the special power in C and the remainder in default
of appointment to Cs issue are void. Under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 501 (1953)
they are valid.
See L SIS & A. SMr, FuTuRE INTrEETs § 1226 (2d ed. 1956).
Omio REV. CODE § 2131.08 (B).
See ABA PEapErurny LEGiSLATION HANDBOOK 3-25 (3d ed. 1967).
1968]
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The statute is short and cast in general terms. Thus it properly
lends itself to construction as the needs of time require. The
amended statute represents a compromise between a strict appli-
cation of a rule of law and a policy of reformation of instruments
that violate the traditional Rule. Ohio is fortunate in having
achieved reformation of the Rule by a statute that is, in general,
a good one.
2" PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 301.4, 301.5 (1950). This, the first of the "wait and
see" statutes, was enacted in Pennsylvania in 1947.
